A Note on Hong Kong's 'Civil Society'

Charles Lee

12 December 2024

「此期之進化原則，則與物種之進化原則不同：物種以競爭為原則，人類則以互助為原則。社會國家者，互助之體也；道德仁義者，互助之用也。人類順此原則則昌，不順此原則則亡。」

'The laws of the evolution of mankind are quite different from the basic law of the evolution of other creatures. Amongst the latter the struggle for existence is the law, whereas men are guided by the principle of mutual aid. A social state is the essence of mutual aid; righteousness, morality, and benevolence are the expressions of mutual aid. Mankind develops and progresses only on the condition that it obeys this fundamental law, otherwise it perishes.'

Sun Yat-sen，《孫文學說》

There is so much talk about 'civil society' in Hong Kong nowadays! The so-called 'pro-democracy camp' praises this concept to high heaven, and after the National Security Law[1] sheds dramatic tears over its supposed recent 'death'. Meanwhile, the 'pro-establishment camp' damns 'civil society' to hell, viewing any mention of it 'unpatriotic' and inimical to law and order[2].

But what is this 'civil society'? The 'pro-democracy camp' automatically points to the massive waves of protests that have rocked Hong Kong over the past decade. 'This', says the 'pro-democracy camp', 'is the wonder of civil society!' For the 'pro-democracy camp', 'civil society' evidently means endless protests in the streets combined with wild slogans.

In response, the 'pro-establishment camp' can only look upon 'civil society' with fear, for it experiences all the consequences that come with endless street protests – including the disruption to daily life, even the loss of economic livelihood. Most of all, they witness the inevitable outcome of all aimless and pathetic protests: violence and riots. 'If this is civil society', says the 'pro-establishment camp', 'then I am against civil society!'

The only way to clear up so much confusion is to return to the original meaning of civil society.

'Civil society' is the world of groups, associations and organisations which are formed to serve the needs of their members or society at large. Everything from trade unions and restaurants to churches and student clubs constitute civil society. Civil society is not only where we earn our daily bread, but, more importantly, it is where man learns to cooperate.

The tendency to cooperate is inherent in human nature, for man is a social animal. Man is like the bees; alone we can accomplish practically nothing, barely even satisfying the requirements for existence, but collectively our powers grow far beyond the sum of their parts. Where more can be made by two than by one alone, there arises cooperation.

Just imagine how much human labour and cooperation is needed to create a simple bowl of rice – from the intellectual who creates the fertiliser, to the farmer who tills the soil, to the merchant who transports it across the land, to the labourer who prepares and cooks it. It is only through cooperation that we can exist as a species at all.

Mencius, that great sage, already identified the natural human sentiment for cooperation two thousand years ago:

If anyone were to suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, his mind would always be filled with alarm, distress, pity, and compassion. That he would react accordingly is not because he would use the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the child’s parents, nor because he would seek commendation from neighbours and friends, nor because he would hate the adverse reputation. From this it may be seen that one who lacks a mind that feels pity and compassion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels aversion and shame would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels modesty and compliance would not be human; and one who lacks a mind that knows right and wrong would not be human.

Mencius, Book II, Part A, 6.

The most extraordinary feature of civil society is that all its activity is voluntary. Amidst the millions of interactions that happen each day between individuals in civil society – from friendship and conversation to association and trade – force or coercion never appears. This is not because men are angels, but indeed because of our cooperative self-interest, which is invariably guided by the principle of service. Every individual can only reasonably expect a reward once they have rendered a service to others. Service is thus the path to independence, to a steady livelihood. The principle of service converts self-interest into a benefit for civil society as a whole. Though there may be natural inequalities between individuals within civil society, all are equal in their potential to provide a service, to at least make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, and thus all are valuable members of civil society.

Civil society is therefore the opposite of the state. The state is a creature not of voluntary cooperation, but of involuntary violence – most quintessentially embodied by the police. The state is only necessary when individuals are incapable of voluntary cooperation, for only animals or criminals require a guard to constantly oversee them.

The absence of the state does not mean that civil society is a land of lawlessness, only that civil society imposes only its own laws on itself without need for a state. Think of the many rules and standards that are needed to run a restaurant – from the chef and waiter’s discipline to the menu and uniforms – yet how all are followed without the need for the constant watching eye of a policeman! Civil society can exercise self-government over itself without the need for violence.

Against this vast background, the 'pro-democracy camp' proudly proclaims itself to be the sole representative of Hong Kong’s civil society. A bold claim! But how does it measure up to reality?

The 'pro-democracy camp' is most famous for its endless street protests against the government – indeed, this is its sole activity. But let us not mince words: street protests require the bare minimum of cooperation. To join a protest, one need only put on their shoes and fill their mouth with someone else’s slogans. No service is provided to another, no need nor want satisfied except the desires of the protesters themselves. What’s more, the street protests of the 'pro-democracy camp' were often deliberately designed to cause maximum disruption to daily life – in other words, maximum disruption to the daily activity of cooperation in civil society – simply in order to embarrass and pressure the government.

Indeed, during its 2019-2020 protests, the largest it has ever held, the 'pro-democracy camp' actively blocked the possibility of cooperation through the principle of 'no big stage' (無大台)[3]. This principle meant a complete ban on the formation of groups, associations and organisations to even attempt to organise the movement. Therefore, no organisations could arise to debate or control the methods of protest, let alone responsibly negotiate with the government. Instead, atomised division reigned, where unfortunate participants at each protest were united only by their physical proximity to each other, rather than any power over the direction of the movement.

Cooperation in an organisation which is worth anything has rules and regulations to ensure the orderly participation of its members; the 'pro-democracy camp' abandoned all of these in favour of the complete political irresponsibility of the 'no big stage'. For all its talk of 'democracy', at the protests of the 'pro-democracy camp' any minority could disobey or manipulate the majority in the protest without constraint.

The fact that the 'pro-democracy camp' is so little involved in cooperation or Hong Kong’s civil society is not incidental, but derives from the movement’s very essence. The 'pro-democracy camp', naturally, seeks 'democracy' for Hong Kong. Now, nobody can reject the idea of 'democracy' (人民為主), if one is to understand by that term that all public activities should serve the good of the people. But the 'pro-democracy camp' wants something different: it demands that 'the majority' have control over the state so it can have a say in this or that government policy. That this demand comes before all other considerations is made obvious from how political protest to pressure the state is the only substantial activity the 'pro-democracy camp' has ever engaged in. What other goal than the possession of a slice of state power could such a narrow tactic aim?

However, civil society, as we have explained above, has no need for the state. Cooperation does not need state laws besides the most basic which ensure order and the freedom of association. Civil society is thus independent of government policy: it requires no use of force and derives from the most natural tendencies of the people themselves.

Civil society and 'democracy' – in the sense understood by the 'pro-democracy camp' – are thus a world apart. The 'democracy' pursued by the 'pro-democracy camp' can only mean a change in rulers, a new master called 'the majority' to enforce coercive laws, yet civil society aims to get rid of all coercive laws. There is no inherent reason why the attainment of 'democracy' will empower civil society if the people have yet to educate themselves in the powers of cooperation. On the other hand, the most perfect cooperation will inevitably result in the attainment of 'democracy' in the best sense of the term – a world in which all activities will redound to the public interest.

If individuals cannot cooperate with each other naturally and voluntarily through civil society, how are they meant to cooperate through a violent state, where coercive laws will inevitably be enforced by one faction over others, whether 'the majority' over 'the minority' or one interest group over another? If the citizenry is not capable of managing even a kitchen or a district council meeting, how are they to be capable of managing a city, let alone a country?

If anything, the mindless pursuit of 'democracy' by the 'pro-democracy camp' has only served to provoke legislation against Hong Kong’s civil society, to cause it to come under attack – this was the only outcome of the 2019-2020 protests, which transformed a relatively mild Extradition Bill into the draconian National Security Law.

Ironically then, it is precisely because the ''pro-establishment camp' is free from preoccupation with 'democracy' and solely interested in maintaining the status quo that it in practice shows itself to be the far greater contributor to Hong Kong’s civil society. The 'pro-establishment camp' is responsible for the overwhelming number of whatever non-government social services that are provided in Hong Kong; these include care for the elderly, legal advice, road regulation, and cultural activities. All such services require levels of cooperation far higher than any political protest ever has. At almost every public housing estate in Hong Kong one can find the open office of the 'pro-establishment camp'; the 'pro-democracy camp' is too busy calling for the next protest.

Yet how weak remains Hong Kong’s civil society! The 'pro-democracy camp' weeps over the supposed 'recent' death of Hong Kong’s civil society, but such tears only hide an uncomfortable truth: Hong Kong’s civil society has long been dead, if it was ever even alive.

Let us examine the real state of Hong Kong over the past decades, not as it appears in the rose-tinted glasses of the 'pro-democracy camp', but in undeniable economic facts about the depths of Hong Kong’s civil society.

• One-in-five Hong Kongers live under the poverty line.

• There are 100,000 subdivided flats, which contain 226,000 people.

• Hong Kongers work some of the longest hours in the world, with more than half working upward of 45 hours a week, and some up to 70 hours.

• The birthrate is at a historic low of 0.75 births per women, so that Hong Kong’s population cannot even reproduce itself.

Indeed, the condition of Hong Kong’s civil society is so miserable that it can no longer provide for itself. The state’s presence in the Hong Kong economy has increasingly grown, all funded by coercive taxes and at the expense of voluntary activity.

• 30% of Hong Kongers need to live in public housing, with an additional 15% receiving subsidies for flats.

• 260,000 people are dependent on CSSA support[4].

Hong Kong’s civil society is incapable of even supplying shelter or basic subsistence to its members, this most urgent of all necessities.

Is this the natural condition of Hong Kong’s civil society? Of course not, for civil society naturally tends to prosperity. The tendency of cooperation should ensure that all needs and wants eventually go satisfied, and that everyone should be independently able to provide a service to another. Anyone who sits in unemployment or wallows in poverty is wasted potential for civil society.

The question then becomes, what is blocking the natural tendency towards cooperation in Hong Kong? The answer is obvious: the principle of profit. To recognise this we need only cast a gaze at the opposite side of Hong Kong. While at one pole accumulates poverty and want, at the other pole accumulates abundance and monopoly.

We return to the economic facts of Hong Kong, this time approaching the situation from its decadent heights rather than its miserable depths.

• Two supermarkets own up to 70% of the grocery market, possessing the power to charge higher prices to consumers and offering lower prices to producers.

• There are two sole providers for electricity and gas providers, each with equally tremendous economic power.

• A limited number of private franchises dominate public transportation, at the expense of the time and money of commuters.

• Above all looms the massive housing monopoly. Hong Kong’s property developers charge the highest prices in the world. However, only 2.3% of Hong Kong’s land is used for private housing; the rest of the land remains deliberately undeveloped. As a result, Hong Kongers spend upward of 70% of the median household income on rent.

These monopolies suck the blood of Hong Kong’s civil society. They are guided by the miserable logic of profit, by which one seeks personal gain at the loss of others. The principle of service leads to maximum cooperation and the satisfaction of needs and wants, the principle of profit leads to the maximum extraction from the consumers and producers of civil society. Every time Hong Kong’s civil society seeks to engage in cooperation, it immediately confronts a monopoly that charges them an exorbitant price for the privilege.

Profit is the enemy of society. As Mencius warned so long ago:

Why must your Majesty use that word 'profit'? What I am provided with, are counsels to benevolence and righteousness, and these are my only topics. If your Majesty say, 'What is to be done to profit my kingdom?' the great officers will say, 'What is to be done to profit our families?' and the inferior officers and the common people will say, 'What is to be done to profit our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In the kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand, and a hundred in a thousand, cannot be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness be put last, and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching all. There never has been a benevolent man who neglected his parents. There never has been a righteous man who made his sovereign an after consideration. Let your Majesty also say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and let these be your only themes.' Why must you use that word – 'profit?'.

Mencius, Book I, Part A, 1.

Between the two poles of want and monopoly lies Hong Kong’s 'middle class'. But this class is not at the doorstep of endless abundance but constantly on the verge of falling into poverty.

In the rare moments the 'pro-democracy camp' and the 'pro-establishment camp' express concern over this dreadful situation – the latter far more often than the former, one must note – they can offer only one solution: minor reforms in the state, namely increased public housing and welfare spending. But this ultimately amounts to accepting the unnatural inability of civil society to provide for itself, replacing the independence of civil society with dependence on the state. The Hong Kong people should not need to survive on the state’s pittance, but only on their own natural powers of cooperation!

Yet, it is ultimately too easy to blame either the monopolies or the state for the sick condition of Hong Kong’s civil society. Neither the monopolies nor the state could exist without the pre-existing weakness of the Hong Kong people, for only a people fit for slavery can and will be slaves. In a word: the Hong Kong people are themselves to blame!

The Hong Kong 'Localists' worship the Hong Kong identity, but rarely do they take time to examine what this identity is and how it was formed[5]. Hong Kong as a city was the product of refugees; it was born out of desperation, the scrambling of individuals and families for day-to-day existence. This original identity is still with us, and has in the present resulted in the stereotype of the 'Hong Kong pig' (港豬) who cares only for daily consumption and entertainment. The result is the great weakness of all non-commercial collective associations in Hong Kong’s civil society, including churches, trade unions, tenant associations, political parties and mutual aid clubs – instead the Hong Kong people prefer collective shopping and collective karaoke. One suspects the 2019-2020 protests were treated by most of their participants as yet another site of entertainment, complete with music and the thrill of the struggle with the police. But the Hong Kong people must trade collective karaoke and collective protest for collective cooperation if Hong Kong’s civil society is ever to stand on its own two feet.

After its almost complete repression by the recent National Security Law, the 'pro-democracy camp' by and large views the future of Hong Kong’s civil society as hopeless. Certainly, the future of the 'pro-democracy camp', which even before its repression contributed practically nothing to Hong Kong’s civil society, is hopeless; thankfully, however, the 'pro-democracy camp' is only one section of Hong Kong’s civil society. Even after the National Security Law, Hong Kong’s civil society as a whole remains relatively unmolested – individuals continue to associate with each other, and food continues to be put on the table. The Hong Kong state has shown itself to have neither the desire nor the capacity to regulate every natural interaction in civil society, only those which are most outspokenly politically disruptive.

Indeed, the National Security Law which has repressed the 'pro-democracy camp' actually provides an opportunity as much as a hindrance for Hong Kong’s civil society. The law for the first time ever restricted the influence of the monopolies over the state, limiting the proportion of seats the tycoons have in the legislative council and the election commission; it thereby created a shield from any further attacks the monopolies wish to rain down. Hong Kong can waste this opportunity in laments about the National Security Law’s restrictions, or it can use it as the first step towards what has always needed to be done.

Neither the 'pro-democracy camp' nor the 'pro-establishment camp' – and least of all the 'Localists' – are up to the task of building up Hong Kong’s civil society. Only the development of cooperation between the Hong Kong people can provide an alternative to the rampant exploitation of the monopolies. The empty fantasies of 'revolution' are a distraction at best, an open invitation for increased repression at worst. The existing political camps can only delude themselves with fantasies about Hong Kong’s past and present, but a new political tendency must look forward towards the needs of the future – the construction of a new, cooperative Hong Kong.

Endnotes

1. Hong Kong’s National Security Law, effective since 2020, criminalises sedition. The 2019-2020 wave of protests in Hong Kong ended soon after its promulgation.

2. Mainstream Hong Kong politics is divided into a 'pro-democracy camp' and a 'pro-establishment camp'. The former supports increased democratisation and is generally anti-CCP, the latter opposes increased democratisation and is generally pro-CCP.

3. This was a slogan in the 2019-2020 protests. It meant that there were to be no formal leaders for the protests, whether individuals or organisations.

4. Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) is the most basic form of government welfare in Hong Kong.

5. 'Localists' are supporters of Hong Kong independence, specifically the establishment of Hong Kong as an independent nation-state.

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